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Toward a Code of Discovery for
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
Since 1967, when the Supreme Court in In re Gault' imposed
"the essentials of due process and fair treatment" upon a juvenile
court system where "wide differences [had] been tolerated-indeed
insisted upon-between the procedural rights accorded to adults and
those of juveniles,"' juvenile courts have had to face the problem of
the scope of discovery to be accorded the child and the prosecutor in
the adjudicative phase4 of a juvenile delinquency proceeding.' The
1387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2Id. at 30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
a 387 U.S. at 14.
4 The adjudicative phase is concerned only with factfinding-determining whether
the youth has committed the specific acts charged. Then, the dispositional phase decides
what treatment (sentence) is appropriate for the child adjudicated delinquent. Glen,
Bifurcated Hearings in the Juvenile Court, 16 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 255 (1970). The
major function of bifurcated hearings is to control the evidence presented at each stage
to ensure that impressionistic, diagnostic, hearsay-type evidence will not be received by
the court at the time of adjudication, i.e., what a juvenile "is" should not influence the
determination of what he has done. Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, in
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, Appendix D, at 91, 101
(1967) [hereinafter referred to as TASx FORCE REPORT].
Earlier juvenile codes employed a unitary hearing with almost total discretion in the
judge. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-5-7-15 (Code ed. 1973). But see Atldns v. State,
259 Ind. 596, 602, 290 N.E.2d 441, 445 (1972) (abuse of discretion in failing to use "least
severe disposition available to the juvenile court which will serve the needs of the case"
(emphasis in original); REPORT OF THE INDIANA CIVIL CODE STUDY COMMISSION: PRO-
POSED JUVENILE PROCEDURE CODE §§ 23, 24 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as PROF. IN.
Juv. PRoc. CODE]. However, several model juvenile codes and many state juvenile court
statutes separate the formal hearing into two distinct phases: adjudicative and disposi-
tional. COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL
RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS rules 19, 29 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as MODEL
RULES]; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
JUVENILE COURT ACT § 29 [hereinafter referred to as UNIFORM ACT]; U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF YOUTH
DEVELOPMENT, MODEL ACTS FOR FAMILY COURTS AND STATE-LoCAL CHILDREN'S PRO-
GRAMS § 32 (prepared by W. Sheridan & H. Beaser 1975) [hereinafter referred to as
HEW MODEL AcTs]; see, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 746 (MIcKinney Supp. 1974).
5 The phrase "juvenile delinquency" embraces not only conduct which is criminal by
adult standards, but noncriminal antisocial behavior as well:
Although there is variation among . . . courts hearing children's cases,
jurisdiction generally includes delinquency, neglect, and dependency. Delin-
quency comprises cases of children alleged to have committed an offense that if
committed by an adult would be a crime. It also comprises cases of children al-
leged to have violated specific ordinances or regniatory laws that apply only to
children, such as curfew regulations, school attendance laws, restrictions on use
of alcohol and tobacco; and children variously designated as beyond control, un-
governable, incorrigible, runaway, or in need of supervision ....
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importance of this determination is underscored by the United States
Supreme Court's developing insistence on more accurate factfinding
procedures in juvenile delinquency proceedings as a means of ensuring
"fundamental fairness."'  Indeed, this insistence, coupled with the
proven effectiveness of civil discovery procedures as factfinding tools
and the almost universal classification of juvenile proceedings as civil,7
has inevitably induced attempts to employ civil discovery techniques in
delinquency proceedings.'
Courts facing the question of discovery in juvenile proceedings
have presented this issue as a choice between civil discovery on the one
hand and criminal discovery on the other.' Neither, however, is fully
apposite. Civil discovery, as framed for the ordinary civil suit, is not
appropriate in a delinquency proceeding where the juvenile faces pos-
sible incarceration." Criminal discovery, on the other hand, even after
a wave of reform in most states, still severely limits a defendant's
pretrial access to witnesses and information.1 This note suggests that
TASK FORCE REPORT at 4; see, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 31-5-7-4 to -7-6 (Code ed. 1973).
To avoid the possibility of overreaching (the imposition of the judge's own code of
behavior on the juvenile) made possible by these vague offensez, which are illegal only
for children, TASK FORCE REPORT at 25, and to avoid the stigna which has attached to
the term "delinquent" several states have renamed this category and redefined the powers
of the police and courts in such cases. See id. at 26. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-
3 (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1974); PROP. IND.
JuV. PRoC. CODE § 4 & Comments. For the purposes of this note, however, "delinquency"
will be used in the broader sense.
6 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971) ; In rc Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
365 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). See TAsK FoRcE REPORT at 30:
[E]fforts to help and heal and treat, if they are to have an:, chance of success,
must be based on an accurate determination of the facts--the facts of the im-
mediate conduct that led to the filing of the petition and aso the facts of the
child's past conduct and relationships.
See also F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRImINAL JUSTICE 18-19 (1964).
7The court in Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1959), found
that this proposition is supported by decisions of the highest cobrts in 42 states, and by
statutes in the other eight states.
8 See generally M. MIDONIcK, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE COURTS: JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY, UNGOVERNABILITY AND NEGLECT § 4.6 (1972) ; Comrrent, Discovery Rights in
luvenile Proceedings, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 333 (1973).
9 Joe Z. v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 797, 801, 478 P.2d 26, 28, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594, 596
(1970) ; In re Edwin RL, 60 Misc. 2d 355, 357-58, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (Fano. Ct 1969).
20 While the use of civil discovery techniques might be benEficial in neglect and de-
pendency cases, Comment, supra note 8, at 340-41, such cases arc tripartite in nature, in-
volving the juvenile, his parents, and the state. Cf. Note, Parceits' Right to Counsel in
Dependency and Neglect Proceedings, 49 IND. L.J. 167, 173 (1973). Such cases are pri-
marily concerned with providing for the physical and emotional welfare of the child and,
thus, lack the possibility of incarceration which prompted the decision in In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), a possibility which ufiderscores the need for allowing the best factfinding
tools available. Therefore, this note will adhere to the same fo-us as that in Gault, the
adjudicative phase of the delinquency proceeding.
11 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEroRE TRIAL § 2.1 (Stand-
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the existing code of civil discovery,12 modified to comport with the con-
stitutional and structural requirements of juvenile courts systems, should
be adopted as the system of discovery for use in the adjudicative phase
of juvenile delinquency proceedings.
PARAMETERS OF DIScOVERY IN DELINQUENcY ADjUDICATIONS
A 1970 California case18 identifies the problems of applying civil
discovery rules to juvenile proceedings. The California Supreme Court
held that the extensive discovery procedures available in civil proceed-
ings were inapplicable to juvenile proceedings because of their "quasi-
criminal" nature and because of the delay inherent in the use of the
civil techniques. Although these objections identify problems inherent
in the wholesale adoption of civil discovery techniques in delinquency
proceedings, they do not preclude all alternatives other than criminal
discovery, as the California court seems to imply.1" Rather, the prob-
lems mentioned suggest the manner in which the civil discovery rules
can be modified to produce a viable code of discovery for delinquency
proceedings-a code consistent with the functional demands as well as
the constitutional restraints on juvenile courts.
The court's use of the term "quasi-criminal" to describe juvenile
proceedings hints at the first of these considerations. Indeed, this term
is merely shorthand for denoting the recognition that
[i]n theory the court's operations could justifiably be informal,
its findings and decisions made without observing ordinary proce-
dural safeguards, because it would act only in the best interest
of the child. In fact it frequently does nothing more nor less
than deprive a child of liberty without due process of law-
knowing not what else to do and needing, whether admittedly or
not, to act in the community's interest even more imperatively
than the child's.15
This punitive aspect, together with the failure of the rehabilitative as-
pirations of the juvenile system,"0 led the United States Supreme
ards with Commentary), at 52-78 (Approved Draft, 1970) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A.
PnojEcr]. But see State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Ct., 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ind. 1974).
12 Since state codes of civil procedure are varied, references in this note to "civil
discovery" will refer to FFn. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
Is Joe Z. v. Superior Ct, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970).
14 Id. at 801, 478 P.2d at 28, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 596.15 TAsK Foaca REPORT, .rpra note 4, at 9. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
16 There is evidence . . . that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (footnote omitted), citing Handler, The
[Vol. 50:808
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Court in In re Gault to mandate various procedural safeguards at the
adjudicative stage, including safeguarding the privilege against self-
incrimination.'7 It is this privilege which constitutes the initial stum-
bling block for the implementation of civil discovery."
The bilateral nature of civil discovery, 9 by affording the state
equal use of the discovery techniques, would inevitably conflict with
the juvenile's privilege against self-incrimination."° To preserve the
vigor of this constitutional privilege, the reciprocity of civil discovery
would have to be modified so that discovery would be virtually unilateral
in favor of the juvenile in areas touching his fifth amendment privileges.
The California Supreme Court identified a further stumbling block,
noting that the delay characteristic of civil discovery would run afoul
of the traditional juvenile court philosophy requiring speedy adjudica-
tion.2' This nearly universal requirement of speed would dictate modi-
fications limiting the periods of time allowed for initiating and respond-
ing to requests for prehearing discovery.2
Special rules for juvenile discovery, whether formally adopted as
a code or judicially tailored within the context of a court's inherent
control of trial and pretrial procedures," could provide for a full dis-
closure of relevant evidence, limited only by the juvenile court's in-
stitutional insistence on speedy disposition, and by the juvenile's con-
Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis.
L. REv. 7.
17 In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court held that in the adjudicatory stage of
the juvenile process, the juvenile possesses the following basic rights: notice of charges,
right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination, arid the privilege against
self-incrimination.
28 In re Marie W., 62 Misc. 2d 585, 588, 309 N.Y.S.2d 280, 2L4 (Farn. Ct. 1970).
19 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (1).20 Boches, Juvenile Justice in California: A Re-Evaluation, 19 HAST. L.J. 47, 87
(1967). "Since the minor possesses a privilege against self-incrimination, discovery in
delinquency cases necessarily would be a virtually one-way affair." Id. (footnote
omitted). But cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Ct., 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (Ind. 1974).2tSee H. Lou, JUvENiLE COURTS IN THE UNrrE STATES 129 (1927).22 The civil rules of discovery offer a very flexible tool. Depositions upon oral ex-
amination require only that reasonable notice be given. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b). The re-
maining procedures specify a 30-45 day period for completion of discovery, yet each ex-
pressly states that the court may allow a shorter time. Id. 31(a), 33(a), 34(b), 36(a).
Thus, the limited periods of discovery required (see notes 50-55 infta & text accompany-
ing) can be accommodated within the existing structure of the ciil rules.
Also, the very nature of juvenile proceedings would facilitate these shorter time
limits. As opposed to the highly complex issues, involving diverse parties and witnesses
and evidence dispersed geographically, which are encountered in civil cases, juvenile cases
generally present relatively simple factual and legal questions, involving a limited number
of parties and witnesses living in close proximity. These factors would tend to limit po-
tential complexity and accelerate notice of and compliance with requests for discovery,
thus making the use of modified discovery feasible within the time periods contemplated.
28 Cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Ct., 317 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1974).
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stitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 4 Guidance in drafting
these rules can be drawn from cases considering the applicability of the
discovery rules under existing codes of civil procedure.
CIVIL DISCOVERY: A MIXED RESPONSE
In ruling upon requests on behalf of juvenile respondents for the
use of civil pretrial discovery procedures, courts have refused to be
bound by a "civil" label." Rather, they have based their decisions on
what they have perceived to be the practical and statutory limitations
intrinsic to their juvenile court systems. Although uniformly denying
the automatic application of the entire civil discovery system, courts
nevertheless have recognized a need for discovery before a delinquency
adjudication.2 6 Judicial response, however, has not been uniform. Some
courts have limited the use of discovery procedures to those allowed in
a criminal proceeding.27 The Illinois Supreme Court, on the other
hand, has authorized the discretionary use of the entire system of civil
discovery.28
In the 1969 case of In re Edwin R.,29 a New York family court
disallowed written interrogatories, depositions, and numerous other
applications for discovery" made pursuant to the New York Civil Prac-
tice Law,"' but did allow limited discovery which corresponded closely
to that permitted by the then proposed New York Criminal Procedure
24 Some of the sanctions available for failure to make discovery would be inappro-
priate in the juvenile context. However, the invocation of these sanctions is within the
discretion of the court which would thus be able to employ a sanction appropriate to the
juvenile court. FED. X. Civ. P. 37. Prosecutorial discovery need not be precluded. See
A.B.A. PRojEcr, mpra note 11, pt. III, Disclosure to Prosecution, at 16-17; State ex rel.
Keller v. Criminal Ct, 317 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1974).2 5 Joe Z. v. Superior Ct, 3 Cal. 3d 797, 801, 478 P.2d 26, 28, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594, 596
(1970) ; People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 II. 2d 171, 174-75, 269 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1971) ;
In re Edwin R., 60 Misc. 2d 355, 357, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (Fam. Ct 1969). As the
Supreme Court emphasized in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971):
"Little, indeed, is to be gained by any attempt simplistically to call the juvenile court
proceeding either civil or criminal. The Court carefully has avoided this wooden ap-
proach."
28 Joe Z. v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 797, 801, 478 P.2d 26, 28, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594, 596
(1970) ; People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill. 2d, 171, 175-76, 269 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1971);
In re Edwin R., 60 Misc. 2d 355, 357-58, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409 (Fam. Ct 1969).
27 E.g., Joe Z. v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970).
See Boches, mpra note 20, at 86.
28 People ex reL. Eanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill. 2d 171, 269 N.E.2d 1 (1971).
29 60 Misc. 2d 355, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Fam. Ct. 1969).
30 Id. at 356, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 407-08. Counsel for the juvenile served written inter-
rogatories containing 104 separate questions on the police commissioner, the corporation
[county] counsel, and the petitioner, a detective in the police department. Petitioner was.
also served with a notice for oral examination before trial, for the production of docu-
ments, and for the admission of 46 separate items. Id.
a' N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 3101-40 (McKinney 1970).
[Vol. 50:808
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Law.82 Counsel for the juvenile invoked a section of the Family Court
Act which provided that the provisions of the Civil Practice Law
apply to the family court "to the extent they are suitable to the proceed-
ing involved. ' 33  The court found these "civil" discovery proceedings
unsuitable for two reasons. First, they require bilateral discovery,
which is feasible only when both sides are represented by counsel. Thus,
they are incompatible with the practice in New York City, where most
petitioners are private citizens (rather than police officers) who are not
represented by counsel at any later proceedings.14  Second, civil dis-
covery is time-consuming and thus contravenes the intent of the Family
Court Act to hold the factfinding hearing within three days if the
juvenile must be kept in detention. 5
Advancing similar arguments, another division of the New York
family court also denied civil pretrial discovery. The court held that
bilateral discovery would violate the juvenile's right to remain silent,
while granting unilateral discovery would be prejudicial to the peti-
tioner, the private citizen who initates the suit.3 6
32 Now N.Y. CRIM. PRo. LAW (McKinney 1971), as amenied (McKinney Supp.
1974).
33 N.Y. FAmmY CT. AcT § 165 (McKinney Supp. 1974). Several weeks later, in
In re Joseph P., 60 Misc. 2d 697, 303 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Faro. Ct. 1969), the counsel who had
represented the iuvenile in In re Edwin R. renewed his attempt to invoke this statute by
seeking interrogatories, pretrial depositions of witnesses, and other disclosures, arguing
that these techniques were suitable to juvenile proceedings. The court, however, ap-
parently following the reasoning of In re Edwin R., denied these requests on the ground
that the procedures requested were impossible to utilize within thQ juvenile court frame-
work.
S4 See In re Edwin R., 60 Misc. 2d 355, 357, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (Fam. Ct. 1969).
35 N.Y. FAmILY CouRT Acr §§ 747, 748 (McKinney Supp. 1974):
§ 747. Time of fact-finding hearing
A fact-finding hearing shall commence not more than three days after the
filing of a petition under this article if the respondent is in detention.
§ 748. Adjournment of fact-finding hearing
(a) If the respondent is in detention, the court may adjourn a fact-finding
hearing
(i) on its own motion or on motion of the petitioner for good cause shown
for not more than three days, provided, however, that if the petition alleges a
homicide or an assault by the respondent on a person incapacitated from attend-
ing court as a result thereof, the court may adjourn the hearirg for a reasonable
length of time;
(ii) on motion on behalf of the respondent or by his parcnt or other person
legally responsible for his care for good cause shown, for a reasonable period
of time.
(b) Successive motions to adjourn a fact-finding hearing may be granted
only under special circumstances.
3 In re Marie W., 62 Misc. 2d 585, 309 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Faro. Ct. 1970).
The Model Rules refer to the moving party as a "complainant" rather than a "peti-
tioner." The word "petitioner" has been retained when New York cases are being dis-
cussed. In all other contexts, the word "complainant" has been uMed in accordance with
the Model Rules.
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The reasoning of these New York cases was reflected in a sub-
sequent California decision. Proceeding on the assumption that it had
the inherent power to order discovery, the California Supreme Court in
Joe Z. v. Superior Court87 held that the extensive civil discovery pro-
cedures were not and should not be available to juveniles. The court
justified this decision on the ground that the policy of the juvenile code
in promoting "expeditious and informal adjudications in juvenile court
belies the wisdom or necessity of any indiscriminate application of civil
discovery procedures.""8 Nevertheless, the court did not deny the
juvenile petitioner the use of other discovery procedures. Instead, the
quasi-criminal nature of delinquency proceedings led the court to grant
juvenile courts the same degree of discretion possessed by courts in
criminal cases to grant discovery89 which would not "unduly hamper
the prosecution or violate some other legitimate government interest"'"
by facilitating the elimination of an adverse witness or by influencing his
testimony."
The broadest interpretation of the discretionary powers of the
juvenile court judge to grant discovery was expressed in the 1971
Illinois Supreme Court decision in People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt.42
The juvenile court judge, in ruling upon the juvenile's petition to take
the victim's deposition, felt compelled to approve the use of the discovery
procedures applicable in civil cases because of the "civil" denomination
of delinquency proceedings in Illinois and because "the underlying pur-
pose of a delinquency proceeding would best be served by allowing broad
pretrial discovery . . . [which] can insure that all relevant factual in-
formation is brought before the court. '48
Entertaining an original proceeding for mandamus to compel
the judge to vacate his pretrial discovery order, the Illinois Supreme
373 Cal. 3d 797, 478 P.2d 26, 91 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1970).
38 Id. at 802, 478 P.2d at 28, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 596 (citation omitted). Here the court
cited In re Edwin R., 60 Misc. 2d 355, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Farm. Ct. 1969).
39 3 Cal. 3d at 801, 478 P.2d at 28, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 596. In addition to citing many
of its landmark cases granting discovery in criminal cases, the court also cites Boches,
supra note 20, which concludes:
Specific provision should be made for discovery at least as broad in scope
as that currently provided in criminal courts. This would include the right of
the minor to obtain such things as copies of his own statements, statements of
the prosecution's witnesses, names and addresses of eyewitnesses known to the
probation officer and notes used by the police officer in preparing his police report.
Boches at 87 (footnote omitted).
40 3 Cal. 3d at 804, 478 P.2d at 30, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
41 See People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 246-47, 384 P.2d 16, 29, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424,
437 (1963).
4248 Ill. 2d 171, 269 N.E.2d 1 (1971).
43 Id. at 173, 269 N.E.2d at 2-3.
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Court rejected the state's contention that the standard of proof and rules
of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings, which by statute govern
delinquency proceedings, made civil discovery procedures inapplicable."
Instead, it found that these provisions were intended primarily for the
protection of the juvenile, and were not designed to prohibit the use
of discovery procedures." The court, however, while noting that the
paramount concern of the juvenile code is the welfare of the juvenile,
also recognized that the juvenile system safeguards another legitimate
community interest-protection of the community from antisocial be-
havior." Because of this dual function, the court held that the applica-
tion of civil discovery procedures to juvenile proceedings should be dis-
cretionary rather than automatic: the juvenile court judge must
balance those purposes of the delinquency proceedings which are fur-
thered by civil discovery techniques-more complete and accurate fact
determination-against the possible dangers to the community "in a
particular attempt at discovery. '4 7 The court perceived these potential
dangers to be harassment and intimidation of witnesses, suppression of
4Id. The state's argument, when read against the juvenile court judge's reasoning,
see text accompanying note 43 supra, demonstrates the parado: encountered when the
labels "civil" and "criminal" become determinative of the rights to be granted to juveniles.
Normally, the juvenile's counsel argues that the delinquency adjudication is criminal in
nature and, therefore, that juveniles should receive all the safeguards available to a
criminal defendant. The state, on the other hand, argues that juvenile hearings are
civil (nonpunitive) in nature and that civil procedures should apply. However, with
discovery, the positions are just reversed. Hoping to take advantage of the broader
scope of civil discovery, the juvenile's counsel invokes the civil denomination of delin-
quency proceedings. The state meanwhile argues that delinqumcy adjudications were
found to be "quasi-criminal" in Gault, thus mandating discovery only as broad as that in
a criminal case. Obviously, labels cannot be determinative. See note 25 supra.
The argument for the state demonstrates the unfortunate tendency to consider
Gault's analogy of a delinquency adjudication to a criminal trial and the subsequent grant
of fundamental due process safeguards as tantamount to a holding that this juvenile pro-
ceeding is criminal in nature. However, this is a misapplication of Gault. As the Court
has consistently said:
[T]he juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a "criminal prosecu-
tion," within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment, and also has not
yet been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects merely beause it usually has
been given a civil label.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971). Accord, In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 365-66 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17, 49-50 (1967) ; Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). The Court has traditionally emphasized the unique character
of the juvenile court (based primarily on its rehabilitative philosophy) and, thus, there
would seem to be nothing contradictory in granting due process safeguards to ameliorate
the punitive aspects, while granting civil discovery to facilitate rehabilitation. Indeed,
the Illinois Supreme Court so held. People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 Ill. 2d 171, 175,
269 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1971).
45 48 Ill. 2d at 175, 269 N.E.2d at 3.
41 Id. at 175, 269 N.E.2d at 4. See TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 8-9; F.
ALLEN, supra note 6, at 53.
'I 48 Ill. 2d at 175-76, 269 N.E.2d at 4.
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evidence, and increased perjury. 8 Since the juvenile court had not con-
sidered these dangers in ordering the deposition, the court vacated its
order and remanded the case for such a determination. 9
MODIFIED DIscOvERY: AVOIDING THE OBJECTIONS TO FULL DISCOVERY
The cases rejecting unrestricted discovery in juvenile proceedings,
discussed above, suggest three major objections to the employment of
full civil discovery techniques: the inherent delay, the limits on the
reciprocity of discovery, and the possibility of abuse. Although these
objections were advanced against the use of full civil discovery in the
juvenile context, any modified system of civil discovery in juvenile
proceedings must also be tested against them.
Delay
1. Accommodation Within Present Statutory Schemes
Courts in both New York and California rejected civil discovery
because they assumed that its use would result in delays exceeding
statutorily prescribed time limits. Yet, neither court made an effort to
accommodate civil discovery within the existing statutory schemes for
delinquency adjudications.
The New York family court rejected civil discovery because any
delay incurred in its use would have violated a legislative mandate that
the factfinding hearing be held within three days after the filing of a
petition " and that adjournments be strictly limited"' if the juvenile
must be kept in detention. The case requiring detention presents the
most compelling argument for speed; yet detention of a delinquent many
times results from the alleged commission of a serious crime,"' the
situation in which discovery is most needed. Thus, even though this
singularly strict time limit does not apply if juveniles are not detained,
it would nevertheless make inevitable the denial of even the more ex-
48 Id. at 173, 269 N.E.2d at 2.
49 Id. at 176, 269 N.E.2d at 4.
10 N.Y. FAMILY CouRT Acr § 729 (McKinney Supp. 1974) provides that no juvenile
may be detained for more than 72 hours or the next day the court is in session, whichever
is sooner, without a detention hearing or the filing of a petition. Thus, there would be
two three-day limits imposed: the first for a detention hearing or the filing of a petition
and the second for the factfinding hearing.
51 N.Y. FAmY CouRT AcT §§ 747, 748 (McKinney Supp. 1974), set forth in note 35
mopra.
52 Indeed, among the criteria used in determining whether a juvenile should be de-
tained are: (1) the seriousness of the offense and (2) whether detention is required to
protect the person or property of others. Sumner, Locking Them Up, 17 CRIME & DE-
LINQUENCY 168, 176 (1971); HEW MODEL Acrs, mipra note 4, § 20. See IND. ANN.
STAT. § 31-5-7-12 (Code ed. 1973).
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peditious modified discovery in just those situations where it would be
most help ful.
The California Supreme Court rejected civil discovery because its
inherent delay would have contravened the legislature's goal of speedy
adjudication." The California statute"' which effectuates this policy,
however, is more liberal in its timetable for disposition than its New
York counterpart and is also more consistent with the time periods
provided by other states and by the model acts." Thus, the 15 day
period provided by the California statute would allow sufficient time
before the factfinding hearing to depose witnesses, using the restricted
time periods of modified discovery. In cases where the juvenile need
not be detained, there would be sufficient time for the operation of all
modified discovery procedures. Thus, states with juvenile codes similar
to California's, or patterned on the model acts, provide some relief from
the rigor of apparently inflexible time limits and would allow the use of
modified discovery within existing statutory schemes.
Moreover, the California juvenile code provides that the court, upon
request of counsel for the minor, may continue the hearing beyond the
statutory time limit." Seemingly, courts in their zeal to expedite juvenile
proceedings have overlooked or ignored the fact that a juvenile, in order
to obtain the potentially significant benefits of successful discovery,
might well acquiesce in any additional delay which would result from
employing civil discovery procedures. It is even more likely that a
juvenile would acquiesce in any additional delay under modified dis-
covery, where the delay, if any, would be short, and the juvenile would
be the party seeking to invoke discovery. A modified system of dis-
covery would thus provide the added safeguard that if the juvenile and
5S See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 680 (West 1972).
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 657 (West 1972).
Upon the filing of the petition, the clerk of the juvenile court shall set the
same for hearing within 30 days, except that in the case of a minor detained in
custody at the time of the filing of the petition, the petition must be set for hear-
ing within 15 judicial days from the date of the order of the court directing
such detention.
55 MoDEL RULES, mpra note 4, rule 17 (seven days); UNIFoRm AcT, supra note 4, §
22 (ten days) ; see, e.g., ILL. Riw. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-2 (Smith.-Hurd Supp. 1974) (ten
days). See INDIANA SUPREME CoURT AnvisoRy COMMITTEE, JUVENILE RULES oF PRo-
cEnuaE 12(B), 17(B) (tent draft July'5, 1974, unpublished). Rule 12(B) requires the
juvenile court to set a time for factfinding hearing, though setting no time limit. Rule
17, which governs the conduct of all hearings within that act, specifies in section (B)
that if "the child is in detention, a fact-finding or waiver hearing, after such hearing has
begun, may not be adjourned for more than three (3) days, except for the production of
evidence or other proper cause." Id. Thus the timing of the adjudicative hearing would
be in the hands of the juvenile court and not subject to strict timae limits.
5 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 682 (West 1972).
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his counsel feel that the potential harm from delay would be greater
than the benefits of discovery, discovery need not be invoked.
2. The Impact of In re Gault
The rationale of In re Gault presents further argument for not
adhering closely to the statutory limits set out above. These salutary
state statutes, designed to prevent extended predisposition detention of
delinquents in admittedly inadequate facilities, were enacted before the
landmark decision in Gault." In that case, however, the Supreme Court
accorded juvenile delinquents fundamental due process protections,
including the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to timely
notice of hearings." Both of these protections belie the benefit of in-
ordinate haste before adjudication and thus conflict with such state
statutes. In fact, the Supreme Court in Gault enunciated a requirement
of effective assistance of counsel, stating:
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regu-
larity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a de-
fense and to prepare and submit it.""
Indeed, if the right to assistance of counsel is to be more than illusory,
counsel must have sufficient time, at least at the adjudicative stage, to
supplement, as well as scrutinize, the evidence and information presented
in order to ensure reliable factual determinations. 0
In response to the procedural revolution wrought by Gault, the
Office of Youth Development of the Department of Health, Education,
5 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 36-37. A study prepared for the President's
Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice found that in 1965, two-
thirds of all juveniles apprehended were admitted to detention facilities and held there
an average of 12 days. Id. at 37.
58 See note 17 supra for the other protections granted by Gault.
59 387 U.S. 1, 36 (footnotes omitted). See PRop. IND. Juv. PRoc. CODE, supra note 4,§ 23, Comments:
The . . . provision . . . requiring adjournment when the child's attorney
had not had time to acquaint himself with the case . . . merely delineates what
Gault requires on constitutional notice grounds-that child, parents, and counsel
must have adequate time to prepare to meet the charges.
60 Wizner, The Child and the State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4
COLUm. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 389 (1972).
Whatever the focus, fact-finding is the primary task of the adjudicatory phase
of the juvenile court proceedings. One-sided investigations by social workers
and police have led to reports which contain questionable data. Juveniles' social
files, often introduced at the adjudicatory hearing, typically contain rumor, gossip
and prejudicial school and probation reports, as well as psychiatric reports full
of professional jargon that impresses judges. Psychiatric testing done under
court auspices has produced results which differ significantly and prejudicially
from test results obtained by defense experts.
Id. at 397-98 (footnotes omitted).
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and Welfare promulgated a model juvenile court code which accom-
modates the still valid concern for limiting the length of detention with
the right to effective assistance of counsel in a way which would facilitate
the full implementation of modified discovery. The Bureau accomplished
this by retaining a requirement that an adjudicative hearing be com-
menced within ten days from the date the petition is filed if the youth
is denied release at his detention hearing,6' but excluded the following
situations, inter alia, from this ten-day limit:
(1) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the child, including but not limited to, an examina-
tion and hearing relating to mental health, pre-hearing motions,
waiver motions, and hearings on other matters, but not to exceed
an additional period of 20 days (Saturdays, Sundays and holi-
days included) except with the consent of the child and the child's
counsel where the child in custody is denied unccnditional release
at the child's detention or shelter care hearing;
(2) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted
at the request of the child and the child's counsel....62
By implementing such simple provisions, states revising their juvenile
codes63 could ensure accurate factual determinations by providing suffi-
cient time before an adjudicative hearing to allow counsel to employ
modified discovery. Such discovery, with its shortened periods for
invocation, would also comport with the spirit, as well as the intent, of
the relevant state statutes to prevent long delays when juveniles must be
detained.
In sum, "modified discovery" would allow sufficient time to pro-
vide effective assistance of counsel, as mandated by Gault, while creating
a minimum of delay under the existing framework of most state juvenile
codes.
Limits on the Reciprocity of Discovery
A further objection to modified discovery is that it would afford
the juvenile discovery rights greater than those of the complainant. In
matters pertaining to the conduct which serves as the basis for the de-
linquency charge, the juvenile would be free to discover whatever evi-
61 HEW MODEL Acrs, supra note 4, § 17(a) (1).
021d. §§ 17(b)(1), (2).
Gs The Supreme Court has expressly invited states to experiment with and innovate
their juvenile systems: "We are reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further
and to seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the problems of the
young . . . . The States, indeed, must go forward." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
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dence the complainant intends to use, but the complainant could not
force the juvenile to divulge his own knowledge of the evidence." At
least one court has found this lack of reciprocity to be prejudical to the
complainant," in part because the relevant evidence may be limited to
the juvenile's delinquent acts, such that the juvenile will have unrestricted
discovery against the complainant, while the complainant will find all
"discoverable" evidence to be privileged."8
In areas of privilege, however, discovery is never symmetrically
reciprocal. Rules of civil procedure limit discovery to evidence not
privileged. 7 However much this may give advantage to the holder of
the privilege, 8 the advantage is one inherent in the recognition of
privileges per se, and marks the point where the concern for the fullest
disclosure of facts is counterbalanced by other policies. The remedy,
however, is not to deny full discovery to the juvenile: this would in
many cases allow the juvenile to build an effective defense only if he
waived his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 9 Rather,
it must be recognized that juvenile proceedings are not sporting events
but quests for truth.7 This theoretical need for equality is counter-
balanced by the reality that delinquency proceedings may result in
incarceration. Mere speculations of prejudice should not justify the
denial of the broadest discovery of facts possible.71
A subsidiary problem of reciprocity is that, to be effective, dis-
covery must be conducted by an attorney. While the juvenile is now
guaranteed the right to an attorney, 2 the complainant-a layman-often
is not.78 In such circumstances, discovery could be effectively conducted
only on behalf of the juvenile.7
64 See notes 19-20 supra & text accompanying for discussion of the impact of the
juvenile's privilege against self-incrimination on civil discovery.
1
05 1n re Marie W., 62 Misc. 2d 585, 588, 309 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284 (Faro. Ct 1970).
66 See note 20 supra.
67 FEDR. Civ. P. 26.
68 To the extent that complainant is precluded from using discovery, it restricts his
ability to obtain evidence and prepare his case, and to this extent can be seen as allowing
a tactical advantage to the juvenile. Cf. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or
Apparent, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 57 (1961) ; Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 228 (1964).
69 Cf. State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Ct., 317 N.E.2d 433, 438 (1974), citing Wardios
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 (1973).
70 Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 279.
71 The New York court merely asserted that "granting unilateral pre-trial discovery
for the sole benefit of the respondent would be prejudicial to the petitioner." In re Marie
W., 62 Misc. 2d 585, 588, 309 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284 (Fan. Ct. 1970).72 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
73See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 31-5-7-8 (Code ed. 1973).74 See In re Edwin R-, 60 Misc. 2d 355, 357, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (Fam. Ct 1969).
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Under older juvenile codes, it was not thought necessary to provide
counsel for the complainant since the juvenile court judge was expected
to play an active role in the adjudication-assisting both the prosecution
and the defendant in eliciting the facts. This practice, in which the
judge acts on behalf of the state as parens patriae,"5 has come under in-
creasing criticism.7 The trend now is to recognize that it is the state,
rather than the complainant, which is the real party in interest to the
proceeding against the juvenile,7 and to provide a prosecuting official
to represent the interests of the state."s
Cf. In re Edgar L., 66 Misc. 2d 142, 145, 320 N.Y.S.2d 570, 573-74 (Faro. Ct. 1971),
where the court states:
The petitioner raises the question as to the practicability of requiring bills of
particulars in the Family Court. He argues that because often petitioners ap-
pear without attorneys, this might discourage lay persons from exercising their
rights to bring a complaint in the Family Court. I do not believe that this is a
tenable argument. If a bill of particulars is justified because it is necessary to
the defense, it is justified whether or not petitioner is represented by counsel.
But see In re Santos C., 66 Misc. 2d 761, 322 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Farr. Ct 1971).
75 Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the American Juvenile Court, in JusTiCE FOR
THE CHiLD 22 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
76 Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 585, 593
(1965); Wizner, supra note 60. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-32 (1967); Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
77 The filing of a petition is merely a method whereby the people and the court
may be informed of the situation which the petitioner alleges to exist, and the
people become the real party complainant and must prosecute the proceedings.
H. Lou, supra note 21, at 100.
78 See MODm. RuLEs supra note 4, rule 24; HEW MoD.L AcT, supra note 4, § 14,
Comment, which states:
This section places the responsibility upon the Prosecuting Officer to repre-
sent the petitioner where the petition alleges either that the child is neglected or
delinquent. This is an appropriate function for the Prosicuting Officer since
the State is the real party in interest to the proceedings. Such a requirement
obviates the necessity of either the judge or the probation officer to assume a
prosecutorial function which would be wholly inappropriat! for them in view
of their other roles in the total proceedings.
See, also, UNiFoRM AcT, supra note 4, § 24(b) ; IND ANA SUPREYE COuRT AnvsoRy Com-
MrrrEE, JUVEMLE RULEs OF PaocF.uRE 17(f) (tent. draft July 5, 1974, unpublished),
which states: "At fact-finding hearings . . . , the interests of the State shall be repre-
sented by the prosecuting attorney of the judicial circuit or his deputy or by counsel of
the department of public welfare."
Compare Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 500 (1963),
as amended, D.C. CoDE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-2305(f) (Supp. V, 1967), which provided
that the corporation counsel could assist the juvenile court "upoa request," with the new
code which requires his participation by making the District of Columbia a "party to all
proceedings." D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-2305(f) (Supp. 1974). He is also required
to "present evidence in support of all petitions." Id. § 16-2316(a). See also TASK FORCE
REPoRT, supra note 4, at 34; N.Y. FAmILY CourT AcT § 254(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974),
which provides:
The family court or the appropriate appellate division of the supreme court
may request the appropriate corporation counsel or county attorney to present
the case in support of the petition when, in the opinion of the family court or
appellate division such presentation will serve the purposes of the act. When
so requested, the corporation counsel or county attorney shall present the case
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Abuse
The Illinois Supreme Court pointed to the potential for abuse in-
herent in attempts at discovery as its reason for denying the "'automatic
application of discovery provisions applicable to civil cases.""9 The
court believed that the dangers of harassment and intimidation of wit-
nesses, supression of evidence, and perjury" would be greater in juvenile
proceedings than in the ordinary civil case because juveniles face the
possibility of incarceration."' Thus, the juvenile court judge was re-
quired to weigh the possibility of these abuses against the benefits of
discovery before approving discovery. 2
This same argument has been raised repeatedly against attempts
to broaden discovery in the criminal system;S8 however, the argument
remains speculative' because the connection between expanded dis-
covery and perjury or harm to witnesses has not been demonstrated."
in support of the petition and assist in all stages of the proceedings, including
appeals in connection therewith.
79 People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Felt, 48 I1. 2d 171, 175, 269 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1971) (em-
phasis added).
so Id. at 173, 269 N.E.2d at 2.
81 Id. at 175, 269 N.E.2d at 3.
82 Id. at 175, 269 N.E.2d at 4.
88 This view was expressed by Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt in State v. Tune,
13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) :
In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often
discovery will lead not to honest fact-fnding, but on the contrary to perjury and
the suppression of evidence. Thus the criminal who is aware of the whole
case against him will often procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false
defense . . . All these dangers are more inherent in criminal proceedings
where the defendant has much more at stake, often his own life, than in civil
proceedings. The presence of perjury in criminal proceedings today is extensive
despite the efforts of the courts to eradicate it and constitutes a very serious
threat to the administration of criminal justice and thus to the welfare of the
country as a whole.
84 Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. has responded to the Vanderbilt
view:
[H]ow can we be so positive criminal discovery will produce perjured defenses
when we have firmly shut the door to such discovery? That alleged experience
is simply non-existent....
I must say I cannot be persuaded that the old hobgoblin perjury, invariably
raised with every suggested change in procedure to make easier the discovery of
the truth, supports the case against criminal discovery. I should think rather
that its complete fallacy has been starkly exposed through the extensive and
analogous experience in civil causes where liberal discovery has been allowed
and perjury has not been fostered. Indeed, this experience has suggested that
liberal discovery, far from abetting, actually deters perjury and fabrication.
Brennan, supra note 70, at 290-91.
8 5As one court noted: "[T]he point is built one-sidedly of untested folklore."
United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
It may be, of course, that the "hobgoblin," like other things that alarm us in the
night, is simply the heightened after-image of genuine experience which cannot
be altogether denied or discounted. But nobody knows the degree of the prob-
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Indeed, the limited data gained from the use of an experimental Vermont
statute" which allowed the use of depositions by criminal defendants
lend no support to this argument. 7
The A.B.A. has also suggested that the strength of this intimida-
tion and perjury argument has been ebbing recently, "perhaps [as] the
result of recognizing the fact that the dangers envisioned from broad
discovery can reasonably be anticipated in only a small minority of
criminal cases."88 Similarly, Professor Louisell has stated:
The law should take account of these realities, and draw the line
between the typical, and organized, crime. In the usual criminal
case, the norm would be discovery as full-fledged as that which now
characterizes civil litigation. . . . Discovery, however, would
be withheld, or perhaps allowed subject to restrictions, upon a
showing by the state that by reason of the nature of the accused's
associations . . . , it would likely lead to improper uses such
as threats to witnesses. Among such restrictions might be delaying
the time of allowance of discovery 89
The rationale of this observation would be even more compelling in the
juvenile system where the "defendants" are youths whose potential for
such abuse is generally less than the typical criminal, let alone a member
of an organized crime syndicate."
ability of perjury; certainly, nobody has even a hunch sufliient to override the
solid claims of all defendants because some may use a legitimate means of trial
preparation (the way some always do) as a device for the subversion of justice.
Id.
86 No. 147, [1961] Vt. Acts 174-75 (repealed 1973).
87 This experiment centered on a 1961 Vermont statute granting full discovery powers
to defendants in criminal cases-allowing a defendant, on a showing that the witness's
testimony may be relevant to the trial or of assistance in the preparation of his defense,
to take depositions of witnesses. Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Dis-
covery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732, 733 (1967).
The author goes on to say that:
The statute provides that the right to take depositions shall be granted on
motion before an appropriate judge. In practice, however, these provisions
have seldom been used, as after the first few months of experience, depositions
were taken almost universally by stipulation . ...
It is also interesting to note that there was not a single mention of an in-
stance of abuse of these statutes.
The parade of "horribles" escaping from Pandora's bo. as proposed by the
opponents of change in this are numerous. They include possible intimidation
of witnesses [and] better opportunity to prepare perjured testimony . ...
The interesting thing shown by Vermont's experience is thit all the "horribles"
are imaginary.
Id. at 733-34.
88 A.B.A. PRoj"F, supra note 11, at 37.
89 Louisell, supra note 68, at 100.90Additionally, many juvenile courts are empowered to waive jurisdiction to criminal
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Nevertheless, should the possibility of abuse arise in an individual
case, the civil code provides for protective orders which require a posi-
tive showing of potential abuse before limiting or denying discovery."I
Thus, even if the court's fear of abuse were justified, the resulting prob-
lem could be handled by protective orders within the framework of the
modified code advocated here.
CONCLUSION
Upon examination, the objections lodged against the use of civil
discovery techniques in delinquency adjudications are not persuasive
and would not pose an impediment to the adoption of a modified code
of civil discovery for use in the adjudicative phase of juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. During this time of widespread experimentation
and modernization of juvenile codes, such a provision could be readily
implemented through the promulgation of court rules or through legis-
lation. This reform would assist the juvenile court in ascertaining
reliable information upon which intelligent and appropriate dispositions
courts when confronted with a serious offense or a recalcitrant offender. See generally
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). It has been suggested that the court should
be able to waive its jurisdiction when the case involved a juvenile who is sixteen or older
and has committed an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult and where
the court finds that the safety of the community clearly requires that the juvenile con-
tinue under restraint for a period beyond his minority. U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, EDucA-
TION, AND WELFARE, WELFARE ADMiIN., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE
AND FAMILY COURTS 34-35 (prepared by W. Sheridan 1966). The Indiana Supreme
Court Advisory Committee, in its proposed Juvenile Rules of Procedure, provided that a
waiver proceeding may be instituted if the juvenile is fifteen or older, if there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe that the juvenile committed an act which would constitute a
crime if committed by an adult, and if:
(b) One of the following conditions exists:
(1) The offense is one of a particularly heinous or aggravated character,
greater weight being given to offenses against the person than to of-
fenses against property, and that the child is beyond rehabilitation
under the regular juvenile procedures; or,
(2) The offense, even though of a less serious nature, is part of a repeti-
tive pattern of juvenile offenses from which it is concluded that said
child is beyond rehabilitation under the regular juvenile procedures;
and that
(c) Waiver of jurisdiction is necessary for the protection of the public or is
found to be in the best interests of the public generally.
INDIANA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, JUVENILE RULES OF PRocEDuRE
15(B) (1), (3) (tent. draft July 5, 1974, unpublished). Thus, the possibility for abuse
is even further removed because the cases involving the most serious offenders will be
waived into criminal courts.
"'Upon motion by . . . the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which justice requires
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, [or] oppres-
sion ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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could be based, by providing the accused juvenile a full opportunity to
present his case.
MICHAEL P. GRAY
